In this article I provide an analysis and critique of Nicolai Petro’s A Tale of Two Regions: Novgorod and Pskov as Models of Symbolic Development. I integrate insights from other developmental studies and attempt some implications for my own ministry and context. I also attempt to articulate some biblical insights gained through the study.
Symbolic Shortcuts as a Means for Public Acceptance of Reform and the Role of Local Elites in its Propagation
The Role of Elites, Cultural Symbols, and Cultural Myths in Novgorod and Pskov
Nicolai Petro states that the intent of his study of the Russian cities of Pskov and Novgorod is to demonstrate that “the cultural symbols and myths adopted by regional elites can be a powerful force in shaping local development strategies” (Petro 2006, p. 370). This study contrasts the growth of Novgorod versus the stagnation of Pskov. In Novgorod, the influence of pragmatic individual political leaders has lead to development. While in Pskov, the influence of bureaucratic and unstable political parties led to stagnation (Petro 2006, p. 370). In Novgorod, a strategy for development prioritized growing the shared resources rather than simply extracting the maximum in the short term – a focus on future benefits (Petro 2006, p. 371). By contrast, in the other three pilot regions the focus tended to be limited to distribution of their existing resources (Petro 2006, p. 371).
Petro offers a compelling description of myths that proved relevant to the positive developments in Novgorod. The positively useful myth in Novgorod was its cultural heritage as a center of commerce. In comparison, the study shows that the cultural self-conception of Pskov as a bulwark against outside influence proved to have a negative influence regarding development. In his book To Change the World (2010) J. Davidson Hunter describe such phenomenon as myths that are pre-reflective frameworks of meaning, understandings of the world “so taken for granted that is seems utterly obvious” (2010, p. 32).
We must ask ourselves what sociological lens was used by the researchers cited in Petro’s study. Some of the research used focused on “the impact of Western funds on democratic development” (Petro 2006, p. 372). Petro also explores Western attitudes towards cultural development drawn from conferences organized by the World Bank in Washington D.C. and Harvard University’s Academy for International and Area Studies (Petro 2006, p. 378,379). I detect a level of Western bias in Petro’s study, even as he endeavored to encourage the value of local culture. In the end, the idea that helpful goods from the West could benefit the Russian context was a general pretext. Personally, I have no problem with the notion that one culture can benefit another if it accepts the mutuality of this proposition.
Petro’s study demonstrates how elites in Novgorod were able to find a voice in their cultural context and influence key points of leverage productively for the community. I’m impressed by the Novgorod example as it represents the power of a society finding its voice in a way conducive to positive change. Elites in Novgorod shaped a narrative by giving space for people to narrate their own story. In other words, the elites understood the strategic value of giving their community symbols by which innovation would most likely be appropriated.
Looking at the phenomenon that led to the differences in these two Russian cities, we can use Hunter’s two lenses of cultural change. Applying the common view, the cultures of these cities are understood as rooted in individuals’ hearts and minds in the form of values (Hunter 2010, p. 6). According to this lens, the cultures of Novgorod and Pskov are the sum of the majority population’s values and behavior (Hunter 2010, p. 6). By this account, the positive change in Novgorod resulted from courageous individuals whose values and worldview were productive. When enough people had adopted these values, culture is changed (Hunter 2010, p. 15).
Inversely, if we employ Hunter’s alternative view, the positive changes in the culture of Novgorod were not generated by the truthfulness of ideas, but by their rootedness in powerful institutions, networks, and symbols (2010, p. 44). The opinion leaders in Novgorod were the society elites such as individual political leaders. But Petro’s study also showed the influence of existing institutions such as the local university as well as new institutions such as the NGOs (Petro 2006, p. 376).
The quote from Novgorod’s Governor Prusak that there is “no need to invent artificial ideas, no need to mechanically transfer the American dream onto Russian soil” (Prusak 2006, p. 376) exemplifies the sensitivity to dynamics of local receptivity to outside ideas. Prusak affirms that Novgorod’s history reveals a city combining “democracy, free market relations, and other accomplishments of civilization, with national traditions (2006, p. 376). This type of discourse exemplifies Hunter’s thesis that culture changes through patrons sponsoring intellectuals who propagate alternatives (2010, p. 77). Demonstrating Hunter’s hypothesis, elites in Novgorod symbolized, narrated, and popularized new cultural visions (Hunter 2010, p. 78). In Novgorod’s case these elites were political leaders, university professors, religious leaders, and NGO workers. Prusak can contextualize democracy as something belonging to the Novgorod myth as opposed to a uniquely Western concept. Prusak was speaking to a wounded and demoralized people in post-Soviet Russia. As US-Americans, we often think of democracy as unique product and possession of our culture. Democracy was arriving as a dominant paradigm in Russia, and finding the right narrative to embrace it was key (Petro 2006, p. 369). From this study, it is evident that local Russian leaders had much influence. This contradicts the common Western perception that Putin is all powerful, an example of how our own cultural narratives distort notions of change and development.
Conversely, in Pskov the direction of culture was also determined by elites, but in a different direction and with differing results. The elites of both Novgorod and Pskov made choices based on distinct self-images of their regions – regional myths that shaped social expectations (Petro 2006, p. 374). In Pskov the influence of political parties was greater than that of charismatic individual political leaders. Priority was given to existing institutions over more recent ones, and the establishment of new institutions was not prioritized (Petro 2006, p. 373). The openness to new institutions in Novgorod was demonstrated in partnerships with NGOs encouraged by local elites who were able to find common ground with the social agenda of their community (Petro 2006, p. 372). Openness to foreign investment was a distinct source of jobs with employment of factory workers by international companies reaching 25% (Petro 2006, p. 373). 69% percent of the NGO leaders in Novgorod said they “trusted in government officials”, in contrast to only 27% in Pskov (Petro 2006, p. 377).
Comparison of Cultural Adjustment and Cultural Congruence Approaches to Development
The comparison between advocates of cultural adjustment versus cultural congruence seems to favor the latter considering the Novgorod phenomenon (Petro 2006, p. 378). The idea that traditional culture is the primary impediment to development contradicts the evidence that positive narratives were developed based on Novgorod’s past (Petro 2006, p. 378). In contrast, the cultural congruence model that sees the task of development analysts as connecting transformation to traditional cultural values receives much evidence from Petro’s case study (Petro 2006, p. 378). The Harvard conference Petro refers to concluded that “traditional cultural patterns are the source of poverty, and the central task of development should be to remove them” (2006, p. 379). I find this perspective to be a clear example of Western bias.
It is significant that Petro cites Western development practitioners rather than scholars as arguing that “only developmental practices congruent with strongly held local norms, beliefs, and practices could succeed” (2006, p. 380). According to these practitioners, just as one needs to ask a farmer to know the type of soil, culture must be considered before planting (Petro 2006, p. 380). This approach encourages analysts to “identify components of their culture that can be built upon to have greater synergy in the workplace as a result of working with, rather than against, widely held cultural norms” (Petro 2006, p. 380). Petro’s argument is compelling that when this happens the members of a culture become the executors of change (Petro 2006, p. 380).
In his book Diffusion of Innovations, E.M. Rogers describes early adopters as integrated into the social system, having highest level of influence in most systems, and breaking down majority reticence towards innovation (2003, p. 219). This concurs with Petro’s affirmation that “what determines the success of reform efforts is not the actual historical antecedents, but their interpretation by the current elite “(2006, p. 375).
Perhaps the starkest and impacting statement in Petro’s study for me was the following:
“The fatal flaw of cultural adjustment is that the aspects of culture it seeks to transform are very often the same ones that people cling to in times of change: the comfort and stability of traditional values. As a strategy for economic and social development, therefore, cultural adjustment is doomed to a hostile reception, making implementation a never-ending struggle. So long as development efforts continue to emphasize the need to adjust people’s attitudes to suit develop- mental models, rather than the other way around, this struggle will continue” (2006, p. 380)
This is a stark contrast to the US-American mentality just working harder, trying harder and you’ll win…you’ll get there. Petro argues that cultural adjustment lashes out at traditional social agreement and sabotages the material politicians depend on to gain authenticity (2006, p. 381). However, the cultural congruence approach is also imperfect because it offers no clear metrics to gage change (Petro 2006, p. 381). Petro suggests the solution of engaging traditional culture as a means for transformation. This approach fosters support from locals while simultaneously seeking out means for outside researchers to evaluate the administration of this approach (Petro 2006, p. 381).
Applying the Cultural Congruence Approach to my Context
How can the cultural congruence approach could be applied to my ecumenical and reconciliation work in Europe – in particular Latin Europe where I live. In secular, nominally Catholic nations such as Italy, Spain, and my home Portugal, how can someone from a minority Christian tradition such as me engage traditional culture as a means for transformation? The danger of colonizing and paternalistic presuppositions is inherent in questions from an outsider attempting to bring transformation to a local context. Acknowledging the fact of my own researcher bias, I ask what cultural components in my context could be engaged? And what potential do these cultural components have for synthesis and partnership with productive innovations from abroad? The ambiguity of whether these innovations are in fact foreign or merely perceived as such should be considered as well.
A prior question is what are the innovations I as an outsider would prioritize for the Latin European context? Related to my work, I would choose the vision of the one new man (Eph. 2:14-18) as expressed by the Towards Jerusalem II movement. TJCII claims that the divided Gentile churches find common identity in relation to the novel Messianic Jewish movement that emerged in the 1960s (Hocken & Schönborn 2016, 133). A second tenet of TJCII is that the reconciliation of Jewish and Gentile Jesus-believers is the key to healing of all subsequent divisions in the church (Hocken & Schönborn 2016, 134). The reasoning proceeds that this key has been ignored during the past two-thousand years of church history and is the explanation for the failure of ecumenical attempts at comprehensive restoration of Christian unity. This is a lofty claim which I do not affirm personally, preferring to claim that this is a missing piece in Christian ecumenism, not necessarily the missing piece. A third claim of the TJCII movement is that the original one new humanity vision entailed a Gentile majority that would have honored a Jewish minority scattered from their land. This type of Jewish-Gentile ekklesia would have mitigated against the triumphalism that characterized subsequent de facto Christian history (Hocken & Schönborn 2016, 140). This triumphalism has been expressed in a self-serving church who sees its mission as subjecting the other to itself (Hocken 2009, p. 106).
Returning to the question of what cultural components could be engaged that could work together with the innovations I promote, I offer some suggestions. First is the existence of public repentance initiatives such as the National Memorial Day for Victims of the Portuguese Inquisition, March 31st. The departments of religious science in Portuguese universities are a place where these matters are researched in depth but perhaps not in connection with ecumenical possibilities. I have been developing relationships with academics in the area and pretend to continue these efforts. Also, the Catholic pilgrimages of Nossa Senhora de Fátima and Santiago de Campostella represent, in my opinion, the most vibrant source of religious life in the Iberian Peninsula. These pilgrimages have historically attracted individuals based on supplication and gratefulness, but also repentance and penitence. The latter phenomenon could be linked to a desire for healing of the historic wounds against the Jewish people during the Inquisition, as well as the healing of the land according to theologies of priestly cleansing and identificational repentance (Hocken 2004, 1). I have been partnering with ecumenical ministries to the pilgrims in Southern Spain and am inspired by Petro’s research to develop inroads to the pilgrimage phenomenon in Portugal.
Conclusion
Petro claims that the Novgorod model indicates that significant cultural symbols may have a vital place in encouraging the undertaking of social change by the general public (2006, p. 382). The study of these two Russian cities gives evidence that when confronted by external sources of innovation, people look for familiar symbols that provide an alternative route which best fits their cultural self-image (Petro 2006, p. 382). Symbolic shortcuts that best fit the cultural identity are received while those considered too exotic are resisted (Petro 2006, p. 382). The study of these Russian cities resulted in the following analysis:
“Public acceptance of the interpretations of key symbols proposed by the elite conferred an aura of legitimacy on the reformist policy agenda that accompanied them. This aura created a reservoir of social support that political leaders could tap into to implement their agenda more rapidly and effectively” (Petro 2006, p. 383)
Considering the compelling evidence given in Petro’s case study, I am motivated to focus not only on the organic development of relationships with the Catholic Portuguese neighbors on my street. As daunting as the task can feel for an Evangelical missionary in a majority Catholic context, I am convinced of the strategic urgence of identifying key elites in my context and engaging with them. The development of relationship in this context will undoubtedly require time and dedication which conflicts with the expectations of Western missionary sending churches and agencies. However, the long-term fruit related to the innovations I came to encourage in Latin Europe require an understanding of how change occurs. Part of my job will inevitably be not only to apply the principles of the cultural congruence approach myself, but to educate my Western backers. Only this way will the type of work I am doing make sense to my predominantly North American partners. More importantly, I’m convinced that only this way will my work produce positive development.
Hocken, P., & Schönborn, C. (2016). Azusa, Rome, and Zion: Pentecostal Faith, Catholic Reform, and Jewish Roots. Wipf and Stock Publishers; Biola Library ebooks. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=sso&db=cat08936a&AN=bio.ocn957436514&site=eds-live&scope=site&custid=s6133893 Links to an external site.
Hocken, Peter (2004). Repenting for the Sins of the Past to Heal the Wounds of History. The European Catholic Charismatic Renewal Info-Letter (Euccril), January 20th, Issue 25
Hocken, P. (2009). The challenges of the Pentecostal, Charismatic and Messianic Jewish movements: The tensions of the spirit. Ashgate; Biola Library ebooks. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=sso&db=cat08936a&AN=bio.ocn432995805&site=eds-live&scope=site&custid=s6133893
Hunter, J. Davidson (2010). To Change the World: the Irony, Tragedy, and Possibility of Christianity in the Late Modern World. Oxford Unity Press.
Rogers, E. M. (n.d.). (2003) Diffusion of Innovations, 5th Edition. Retrieved from https://platform.virdocs.com/read/1882033/7/#/4/64/2,/1:0,/1:0
Petro, N. N. (2006). A tale of two regions:Novgorod and Pskov as models of symbolic development. In L. E. Harrison & P. L. Berger (Eds.), Developing Cultures: Case Studies. Routledge; Developing Cultures Case Studies.pdf. https://epdf.pub/developing-cultures-case-studies.html
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